We consider the "and" communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are allowed.
Introduction
Our goal in this paper is to analyze the intrinsic correlation opportunities offered by a given communication device (Forges [3] ). It thus relates closely to the literature on preplay communication, and more precisely to the literature on mediated talk, initiated by Lehrer [8] . In this strand of literature, a game is given, and one wishes to implement correlated equilibrium distributions (c.e.d. thereinafter) of the game as the outcome of communication equilibria, using communication devices of a simple form. In Lehrer and Sorin [9] , it is shown that any c.e.d. (with rational entries) coincides with the distribution induced by some communication equilibrium, where the communication device sends public outputs that depend deterministically on the inputs.
It is natural to allow for repeated preplay communication; namely, to consider situations in which preplay communication proceeds in stages. At each stage, the players send inputs to the device, that sends back outputs. In that case, a stronger result is obtained. Given a game, there exists a communication device with public and deterministic output, that has the following property: every c.e.d. can be approximated by the outcome of an equilibrium of the game extended by finitely many stages of preplay communication. Thus, the same communication device is used for every c.e.d.; only the length of the preplay communication depends on the particular c.e.d.
The previous devices are game-dependent
1
. We wish here to avoid this dependency, and to investigate the existence of universal protocols of communication. Given a communication device, we wish to characterize the set of distributions µ that can be implemented with it, in the sense that: as soon as µ is a c.e.d. of a game G, µ is the outcome of an equilibrium of the game G, extended with infinitely many stages of preplay communication. Moreover, we shall require that the strategies during the communication phase (the communication protocol) does not depend on G.
More precisely, the question we ask here is essentially the following. Let D 1 , D 2 be finite (action) sets for two players and let a communication device be given. We allow infinitely many stages of communication. A protocol consists in the specification of a profile of communication strategies, and of rules used to choose an action, as a function of the sequence of signals received during preplay communication. A protocol induces a distribution µ over the product set D = D 1 × D 2 . A protocol securely implements µ if, for every game G with action sets D 1 and D 2 , the protocol is a Nash equilibrium of the extended game, as soon as µ is a correlated equilibrium distribution of G. Gossner [6] establishes a convenient characterization of secure protocols. In words, a protocol securely implements µ if (i) no player can manipulate the distribution of decisions (ii) at the end of the communication phase, player i's belief on the other player's decision coincides with µ(·|d i ), whatever be the sequence of messages received by player i : the decision player i is about to take contains all the information he has about the decision of the other player.
This question was partly addressed in Bárány [1] , who assumes that at least four players communicate using "phone lines" , and in addition that each player has available a STOP button, that reveals to all players all past communication. Therefore, his study does not fall into our framework. Under these assumptions, Bárány shows that any distribution with rational coefficients can be securely implemented.
We answer our question in the case of a specific communication device, which we call the and -mechanism. The and -operator in logic is defined over {0, 1} × {0, 1} as and(x, y) = xy. By analogy, we define the and -mechanism as a communication mechanism which receive messages x, y from two players, chosen in {0, 1}, and sends them back the value of and(x, y). We assume in addition that each player remembers which message he sent or, equivalently, that the signals to 1 and 2 are respectively the pairs (x, and(x, y)) and (y, and(x, y)). A matrix representation of this mechanism is given below
The crucial feature of this mechanism is that when player 1 sends x = 0 to the mechanism, the signal he gets gives him no information about the value of y (and(0, y) = 0) whereas when he sends x = 1, he is able to deduce the value of y from his signal (and(1, y) = y).
The main rationale for considering this device is that it is the simplest device which, when repeated, allows for a complex intertwining of the information structures of the two players. Indeed, the two information structures H to hope that the techniques developed here may be of use in dealing with more general devices.
Our result is essentially negative: we prove that only babbling is secure. If decisions are not independent of the outcome of the communication phase, the procedure can be manipulated by one player. Our result can be rephrased as saying that any non-trivial attempt to use the intertwining of information structures to generate correlation after infinitely many stages of preplay communication can be manipulated by at least one player. Parts of the proofs below may be found in [5] , [11] .
Our result thus stands in sharp contrast with those of Lehrer [7] . Lehrer studied the and -mechanism in the context of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. In this context, it is natural to study the case where the whole procedure (preplay communication and decision stage) is infinitely repeated over time. Lehrer proves that any distribution with rational coefficients can be obtained. This involves a statistical monitoring of the behavior of each player.
This question is also related to issues in computer science. For instance, in the design of fault-tolerant distributed systems, protocols (i.e., communication strategies) are sought for that enable interconnected processors to perform a given task, even if one (or more) is to fail. More than two processors are assumed, and the communication mechanism consists of secure communication lines between each two processors, which allow them to exchanges messages without being eavesdropped. We refer to Linial [10] for references and an extensive discussion of the links between game theory and computer science.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 contains the model and the statement of the result. Sections 2 and 3 contain the proof. Section 2 deals with the case where finitely many stages of communication are allowed. Section 3 deals with the general case, and is independent of Section 2. Although the result of Section 2 is included in Section 3, its proof is both much more simple and intuitive. We thus find it worthy to include it.
Concepts and results
We take up the study of the repeated and-mechanism described in the introduction. For emphasis, we label the possible messages of player i ∈ {1, 2} as N We recall from Gossner [6] the definition of a secure protocol. 
This definition is motivated by the following property (Gossner [6] ). Given a strategic form game G, define the two games Γ 1 (G) and Γ 2 (G) as follows:
• in Γ 2 (G), players communicate through the mechanism, then play in G.
A protocol is secure if and only if for every G and every Nash equilibrium f of Γ 1 (G), the following is a Nash equilibrium of Γ 2 (G): communicate according to σ, take decisions following φ, then play in G according to f .
We call µ ∈ ∆(D) a secure distribution, or secure information structure, if µ = µ σ,φ for some secure protocol (σ, φ).
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 1 The set of secure distributions is
).
). It is straightforward to generate µ as the result of babbling. Define σ = (σ 3 Finitely many stages
Reduction to minimal information structures
An information structure µ ∈ ∆(D) is called minimal when:
• A symmetric condition holds for player 2.
This amounts to assuming that the statistic d i must be minimal for player i.
For instance, the only minimal information structures in ∆(D
) are the unit masses.
Remark 2: By Proposition 9.3 in [6] , it is enough to prove that minimal secure information structures are unit masses. In the following, we focus on minimal information structures.
Remark 3: Let (σ, φ) be a secure protocol which generates µ.
is "pure" on the support of P σ .
Proof for finitely many stages
We assume here that N stages of communication are allowed.
Let (σ, φ) be a secure protocol, and µ = µ σ,φ . We identify µ to a D
. As noted in the previous section, we may assume that, P σ -a.s., φ i (h i ∞ ) puts probability one on some decision. It is crucial to note that we cannot assume this to hold outside of the support of P σ .
The proof is divided in two steps. First, we introduce a most informative deviation of player i, and argue that up to some permutation of lines and columns, µ is diagonal: at the end of the communication phase, each player knows P σ,φ -a.s. the decision of the other. Second, we introduce a least informative deviation of player i, and prove that µ is concentrated on one decision pair.
Step 1: a most informative strategy We shall define a strategy of player 1 that enables him to know at the end of the communication phase which decision player 2 is about to take. Clearly, the way to get the most information is to use the strategyσ 1 defined as: play I 1 in every stage, irrespective of past signals. This falls short of proving anything since the supports of P (σ 1 ,σ 2 ),φ and P σ,φ may be disjoint: hence, knowing which signals player 2 did receive may not enable player 1 to deduce which decision player 2 is about to take (since the decision rule might be random outside the support of P σ,φ ).
Hence we amend the above definition ofσ 1 as: play I 1 whenever player 2 finds it plausible that player 1 does play I 1 , i.e., when, conditional upon player 2's past signals, there is a positive P σ,φ -probability that player 1 sends the message I
1
. Of course, this is not well-defined since the message sent by player 1 is then a function of the information held by player 2. Therefore, our first task is to show that this construction is essentially meaningful: we show inductively that if player 1 abides by this strategy up to stage n, player 1 will know at stage n the belief held by player 2 on player 1's message at stage n.
Definition 2 Let P be a probability distribution, X be a random variable defined over (H ∞ , H ∞ ), and n ∈ IN . We say that player 1 knows X under P at stage n if there exists an H 1 n -measurable version of X under P .
It is convenient to introduce the set C 
if, for some sequence h n , the signals received along h n by the two players are respectively h 1 n and h 
In the first case, player 1 knows that player 2 asserts a strictly positive probability on I 1 being played in stage n. In the second case, player 1 knows that player 2 does not expect I 1 to be played. 
We distinguish three cases.
In the first case we assume that player 1 knows that player 2 expects N 1 to be played:
and the belief p
) of player 2 at stage n + 1 is given by
In words, after any history h 
In that case, s 2 n = * , and Bayes' rule yields
In each case, the belief of player 2 in stage n + 1 is known to player 1. Therefore, under (σ 
) is either equal to 0 or 1. Using once again the minimality assumption, µ is a diagonal matrix (up to some permutation of lines and columns and after deletion of lines and columns containing only 0's). This ends the proof of Lemma 1. ♣
Step Proof: we prove inductively that the conditional distribution
, the belief over d 1 held by player 1 at stage n is independent of the particular sequence of signals that is obtained at stage n. We emphasize that the belief is computed under the original profile σ.
There is nothing to prove for n = 1 since H 1 1 is trivial; we assume this is true for some n. We shall prove that, P σ 1 − ,σ 2 -a.s.
Fix h
. We need to prove that
We define a strategy σ 2 + that enables player 2 to assess whether or not player 1 receives the sequence h • σ 2 + is defined as:
1. same as 1 forσ By secureness, for every d
By construction,
and
n , * . Thus, (2) follows from (3), which ends the proof of the induction step.
Finally, remark that 
Secure protocols generating minimal information structures
We start with some preliminary results on secure protocols.
Proposition 1 Let (σ, φ) be a secure protocol generating the minimal information structure µ, and σ
In this statement, σ 1 is interpreted as a mixed strategy, and σ
is an equality between probability distributions (elements of ∆(S 1 )). The proposition holds for any general communication mechanism, as long as players remember their past messages (perfect recall). Loosely speaking, it asserts that, for any pure strategy in the support of σ 1 , the induced distribution on decisions is the same.
For simplicity of notations let P = P σ,φ and P = P (σ 1 0 ,σ 2 ),φ , so that P P . We start with a few preliminary results. We then prove Proposition 1 at the end of the section.
s.: at stage n, the beliefs of player 1 on the actual play are the same under P and P .
Proof: This proof relies on perfect recall but does not require the secureness of (σ, φ). Let h 
Proof: let h m ∈ H m be fixed. For n ≥ m, h m may be viewed as a subset of H n (the subset of all histories in H n that begin with h m ). By applying Lemma 3 to each history in this subset, one obtains
The right side is a (P , (H n ) n ) martingale converging to P (h m |H 1 ∞ ) Pa.s.. The left side is a (P, (H n ) n ) martingale converging to P (h m |H 1 ∞ ) Pa.s.. Since P P , it also converges to P (h m |H
Since H ∞ is generated by the countable family of events {h m = h m },
Let X be a H ∞ -measurable version of d 
Using (5) Proof: It is enough to prove that P (d
The initial equality expresses Bayes's rule, the second equality is derived from Lemma 4, and the third one uses that, by secureness, P (d 1 ∈ supp P , and assume that P (d , consider the random variables ρ(d (1 − p) . gdρ . Therefore gdρ = gdρ for every g, which implies that ρ and ρ have the same distribution under P and P . For d
). One has:
where the first and third equalities use minimality properties. Hence the marginals of P and P on D Hence by the first claim
This completes the second claim. ♣
Proof for infinitely many stages 4.2.1 Organization of the proof
We fix a secure protocol (σ, φ) generating a minimal information structure.
be fixed throughout this section. For h n ∈ H n , σ, φ and h n induce a probability P
Proposition 2 For every n, π 1 n is constant P σ,φ almost surely.
Before to proceed with the proof, we first show how to derive Theorem 1 from Proposition 2: The sequence (π
. By Remark 3, the limit coincides with
is thus a singleton, and the same argument applies for µ 2 .♣ Let us describe the organization of the proof. By Proposition 1, one has . We prove in the next section that: 
Observe that there are finitely many pure strategies up to stage n.
For a pair of strategies σ up to stage n, define the set of histories consistent with σ for player 1 as:
Given that P.1, P.2 and P.3 hold, Proposition 2 is a consequence of Proposition 3 below. 
A.2 For every strategy f 2 up to stage n, We prove in Section 4.2.2 that P.3 holds. Next, we prove Proposition 3 in Section 4.2.3.
Informative deviations: c's become a's
The title of this section is best understood with the statement of Lemma 7. We sketch informally the argument used in this section. Assume that player 2, upon receiving the signal I We extend the argument and show that if the signals to player 1 along two sequences h n andh n are the same, π
. This is the content of Lemma 7 below.
We follow standard notations and write XcY ∈ {a, b, c, * } n to denote the sequence obtained by concatenation of the sequence X, then c, then the sequence Y (where X and Y may be empty).
Recall that h i n (h n ) is the sequence of signals to player i along h n (it is the value of the random variable h i n on the set h n ). Let u 2 be a completely mixed strategy of player 2. For every n and
since h We denote by h 2 n the former, and byh 2 n the latter. For any sequence h n =X 0 cX 1 
Lemma 7 For any history
Since the distribution of d 1 must remain unaffected if player 2 plays after h 2 n as if he had received h 2 n , one has
or equivalently
For any such sequence h n , either h n contains strictly less than k b's, or h n = XcY . In the first case, π 1 n (h n ) = π 1 n (r(h n )) by the induction assumption.
Therefore, (9) implies
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof goes by induction over n. We shall drop the qualifier "up to stage n". For n = 1, there is nothing to prove. We assume that the result has been established for n, and consider a pair of strategies (up to stage n + 1) (σ 
The notation σ Step 0:
Observe that p n+1 (ch n ) = p n+1 (ah n ) whenever ch n ∈ supp P σ 1 ,u 2 .
Step 1:
(·| * ) and p n (·| * ) satisfy A.1, A.2 and A.3.
Proof:
We start with A.3. Let XcY ∈ supp P σ 1 (·| * ),u 2 be a sequence of length 
This implies, since τ
A symmetric proof shows that A.1 holds (except that f 
Step 2:
Step 0.
) and p n (·|N A.2 applied to τ
and hence
From
Step 0,
By a linear combination of (10) and (11),
It remains to prove A.
• play N 1 in stage 1;
• switch to f 
The left-hand side is also equal to
By
Step 0, this is also equal to P σ (m 
The left-hand side is also equal to 
